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Development impact calls for knowledgeable 
development practitioners. How then do the operational 
staff of the largest development agency value and use 
its research? Is there an incentive to learn and does it 
translate into useful knowledge? A new survey reveals 
that the bulk of the World Bank’s senior staff value 
the Bank’s research for their work, and most come to 
know it well, although a sizable minority have difficulty 
accessing research to serve their needs. Another group 
sees little value to research for their work and does not 
bother to find out about it. Higher perceived value is 
reflected in greater knowledge about research, though 
This paper is a product of the Director’s office, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World 
Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at mravallion@worldbank.org.  
there are frictions in this process. Staff working on 
poverty, human development and economic policy tend 
to value and use research more than staff in the more 
traditional sectors of Bank lending—agriculture and rural 
development, energy and mining, transport and urban 
development; the latter sectors account for 45 percent of 
lending but only 15 percent of staff highly familiar with 
Bank research. Without stronger incentives for learning 
and more relevant and accessible research products, it 
appears likely that this lag in demand for research by the 
traditional sectors will persist.  
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1   This is a background paper for the 2011 Report on the World Bank Research Program. The paper draws on 
a survey of the views of World Bank staff carried out by Sharon Felzer and Jessica Cameron. The overall task 
manager for the Report was Jean-Jacques Dethier and the director responsible was Asli Demirguc-Kunt. The author 
is grateful to Asli for encouraging him to write this paper and to Asli, Marianne Fay, Aart Kraay, Tamar Manuelyan 
Atinc, Will Martin, Berk Ozler, Mike Toman, Dominique van de Walle and Adam Wagstaff for useful comments. 
However, the author alone is responsible for the interpretations of the survey data provided in this paper. In 
particular, the findings, interpretations and conclusions of this paper should not be attributed to the World Bank or 
any affiliated organization.  2 
 
1.  Introduction 
In trying to understand the impact of development aid, much attention has been given to 
the role played by the circumstances of recipient countries, notably whether their policy 
environment and governance are conducive to high social returns from aid.
2 The literature has 
given less attention to the role played by the staff and managers in donor organizations. In the 
case of the World Bank, there have been concerns about the Bank’s ―lending culture,‖ which 
tends to reward operational staff for the volume of their lending, with (it is argued) too little 
weight given to the quality of lending.
3 In one of the few studies of aid effectiveness to look at 
these issues, Denizer, Kaufmann and Kraay (2011) confirm that the ―macro‖ variables 
concerning recipient countries are relevant to the (subjectively but independently assessed) 
quality of the Bank’s development projects. But they also find that the bulk of the variance in the 
quality of the Bank’s lending operations is within countries rather than between them. The 
quality of the staff in charge of projects on the donor’s side matters at least as much as the policy 
environment on the recipient’s side.  
The knowledge of operational staff within donor agencies is likely to be important to the 
quality of development aid. There is evidence that the stock of prior analytic work by the Bank 
on a recipient country is a strong predictor of the subsequent quality of its lending operations to 
that country (Deininger, Squire and Basu, 1998; Wane, 2004) and that the quality of prior 
analytic work matters to the quality of its projects (Fardoust and Flanagan, 2011). The stock of 
practitioners’ knowledge depends on their demand for knowledge, as well as its supply. Thus the 
incentives for learning within aid organizations have been identified as one factor in the quality 
of development aid (Wane, 2004; Ravallion, 2011). The generation of relevant knowledge and its 
diffusion within donor agencies is a poorly understood factor in development effectiveness. 
While research is clearly a key element of knowledge generation and innovation, any 
large and complex organization like the World Bank will face challenges in assuring that 
                                                           
2   An influential early paper arguing this point was Burnside and Dollar (2000), although others have 
questioned their findings (including Hansen and Tarp, 2001). For a critical overview see Temple (2010). 
3   20 years ago, the Wapenhans (1992) report laid out these concerns in forthright terms. Since then there has 
been an effort to do better through tighter quality control on projects at entry and better project implementation 
practices. But few observers would argue that these concerns are no longer salient. 3 
 
relevant basic research is both produced and used.
4 As the literature on organizations has 
emphasized, a key factor is the ability to exploit the internal division of labor to support 
innovation (Hage, 1999). The role of a designated ―research department‖ in bringing together 
internal research capabilities and in absorbing new external information to assure innovation has 
long been recognized in the literature (following, in particular, Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). But 
having such a department does not guarantee that practitioners will have the incentive to learn 
from research, and that the research produced will serve their needs. In practice, there may well 
be frictions within an organization that inhibit learning even when the incentive is there.  
The World Bank (WB) has a department dedicated to research, the Development 
Research Group (DECRG), within the Development Economics Vice-Presidency (DEC), as well 
as researchers scattered across other units. Research accounts for roughly 1% of Bank staff; there 
are about 75 full-time research staff in DECRG and probably another 25 or so full-time 
equivalent researchers outside DECRG.
5  
DECRG spans all sectors of the Bank’s work. Its research is almost invariably empirical 
and typically draws on economics as the primary discipline, though increasingly drawing on 
insights from other social sciences.
6
  By objective criteria, the scale and quality of its research on 
development exceeds that of virtually all other international agencies and universities.
7 DECRG 
aims in part to serve the needs of its operational units, which provide development lending and 
policy advice to developing countries.
8   
However, we know very little about the demand for the Bank’s research among the 
organization’s operational staff.  How familiar are they with Bank research? How much do they 
rely on it for their work? How do the answers to these questions vary across units and sectors of 
                                                           
4   On the (broadly similar) challenges facing private firms in deciding whether to invest in basic research see 
the discussion in Rosenberg (1990).  
5   A precise count is not available. My count excludes research assistants. 
6   It has been argued that the heavy reliance on economics reflects an undesirable lack of ―ideological 
pluralism‖ at the Bank (Weaver, 2009, p. 505). While multiple ideologies might well balance out, Bank research (in 
common with mainstream economics and other social sciences) aims to be non-ideological. It is unlikely that the 
work of DECRG would attain its current high level of academic credibility if it failed in that aim.  
7   This is based on the IDEAS rankings using a composite index of 20 variables measuring publications, 
downloads and citations based on the RePEc data; the rankings and details can be found here. If one confines 
attention to the Bank’s research department then the University of Chicago alone does better. Also see the data on 
citations assembled in Ravallion and Wagstaff (2010). 
8   External audiences are also important but are not the focus of this paper. For data and analysis on the 
impacts of World Bank research on external clients see Ravallion and Wagstaff (2010).  4 
 
the Bank? We know even less about the incentives for learning among the Bank’s operational 
staff. Those incentives depend crucially on the value attached to WB research by staff for their 
work.  Do the Bank’s practitioners value research for their work, and (if so) does this incentive to 
learn translate into greater familiarity and use of the Bank’s research?  
This paper tries to throw new light on the demand for research by development 
practitioners within the World Bank. A key empirical question is how operational staff are 
mapped into the four groups identified in the following table. If the Bank’s operational staff 
highly value Bank research for their work, and the research done is relevant to their needs and 
accessible to them, then the bulk of staff will fall into the category ―functionally well-informed.‖ 
For this group, the incentive to learn comes with acquired knowledge. There may also be staff 
who are well-informed about research, but not because it matters to their work; they are 
―independently well-informed.‖ And some value research for their work but face hurdles in 
accessing it, so their familiarity is low; these are the ―frustrated uninformed.‖ The remainder 
comprise those who do not see much value to Bank research for their work, and so do not seek it 
out; they can be said to be ―happily uninformed.‖   
    Incentive to learn: Perceived value of Bank research for own work: 










Do not feel the need for research 
and do not have a general interest 
in learning from new research. 
“Frustrated uninformed:”  
Need to know more from research 
but cannot access or finds current 
research of little practical use. 
High 
“Independently well-informed:” 
Do not need research for own 
work, but has a general interest in 
learning about development. 
“Functionally well-informed:” 
Research is an important input to the 
staff member’s work and access to 
relevant research is not a problem. 
 
The paper uses a specially commissioned survey of the World Bank’s senior operational 
staff to determine how they are mapped to these four groups. The paper’s analysis of these data 
aims to better understand the demand for Bank research by the Bank’s practitioners—reflecting 
both their incentives to learn and the responsiveness of the supply of research to their needs.   
2.  The survey 
World Bank staff typically work in (overlapping) teams assigned to specific projects, 
each team having a ―Task Team Leader‖ (TTL) in the Bank’s terminology. The population for 5 
 
the survey was as all ―senior staff,‖ defined as those at grades ―GG‖ and above, which account 
for about one-quarter of all staff. They are all likely to be the TTLs of one or more operations. 
The survey was only sent to GG+ staff excluding DEC.
9  
The survey was implemented using a confidential, web-based, survey tool. On top of 
basic information on Vice-Presidential Unit (VPU), ―sector‖ (essentially synonymous with what 
is called a ―network‖) and years of Bank service, the survey asked a series of questions on 
familiarity with WB research, sources of knowledge about that research, and the value of WB 
research.  
There were 2,900 recipients of the survey instrument and 555 responses. There was only 
a modest variation in response rates across grades, namely 18%, 21% and 15% for grades GG, 
GH and GI+ respectively (as compared to 19% overall).
10 More worrying is that the response 
rate varied markedly across VPUs, as can be seen in Table 1. The lowest response rate was for 
the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) at 12%, while the highest was for Poverty Reduction 
and Economic Management (PRM) at 50%. To the extent that such differences in response rates 
are correlated with perceptions of research there will be a bias for drawing inferences about the 
means for the population of the Bank’s senior staff, although correlations and regressions are 
likely to be more robust.  
3.  Knowledge about research among the Bank’s operational staff 
Learning about research findings is not costless. To be well-informed, practitioners must 
spend precious time searching out and studying research products. The costs for doing so will 
vary across staff, as will the expected benefits.  
The survey asked a number of questions about familiarity and use of World Bank 
research.  The key question was as follows: “How familiar would you say you are with WB 
research products/services on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means not familiar at all and 10 
means extremely familiar?”
11 Figure 1 gives two density functions for the responses, one for the 
                                                           
9    Although six responses came from DEC, presumably reflecting changes in VPU assignments. 
10   These are based on the grade distribution for Operational Units at September 2011 (67.7%, 27.3% and 
5.0% in grades GG, GH and GI+ respectively).  
11   The other options allowed were: ―Not applicable‖ and ―Prefer not to answer.‖ All calculations in this paper 
filter out these responses as missing values. 6 
 
raw data and one with regression adjustment for years of service at the WB (and its squared 
value) and the sector and Vice-Presidency of the respondent. The densities are fairly symmetric 
around a mode and median of 6, and mean of 5.74, with a standard error of 0.10.  
To interpret an average score of 6 we should recall the fact that researchers are a small 
proportion of the Bank’s staff count—somewhere around 1%. To help interpret any given mean 
score, let us assume that—through their writings, presentations and personal contacts—the 100 
or so researchers influence an average number of n Bank staff to become “very familiar” with 
research over the relevant time period. Of course there is an overlap, in that the same operational 
staff come back again and again. So n should be interpreted as the mean net gain attributed to the 
influence of individual researchers. To keep this simple, let us also assume that the rest of the 
staff know nothing about research. So the researchers are able to make 100n staff very familiar—
a score of 10 on the scale. There are about 2,900 staff in the relevant population. Clearly, to 
achieve the top score of 10, researchers would need to bring n=29 staff on average up to a 10.  
What then will be the value of n implied by an average score of s? It is readily verified that the 
answer is 3.22(s-1).  So a mean score of 6 requires n =16; individual researchers would have 
made an extra 16 Bank staff (on average) ―very familiar‖ with WB research.  To get a mean 
score of 8 they would need to reach 23 Bank staff; by contrast, if they only reached 10 staff the 
mean score would be 4. 
There is substantial variation in familiarity with research across Bank units and sectors of 
work. The Bank has a matrix structure whereby staff are mapped to both a VPU and a ―sector‖ 
(also called ―network‖). Table 2 gives summary statistics stratified by VPU. There is less 
variation in familiarity between regional VPUs than sectoral VPUs. Among the Bank’s regional 
VPUs, the lowest mean score for familiarity is for East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) while the 
highest is for the Middle-East and North Africa (MNA). Defining ―high familiarity‖ as those 
with a self-rated score of 6 or more, we find that over two-thirds of respondents in MENA have 
high familiarity, as compared to less than 45% in EAP. Of course, not all of these differences are 
statistically significant; indeed, only for two VPUs—namely the Human Development Network 
(HDN) and PRM—are the differences in either the mean score or the proportion with high 
familiarity significantly different (at the 5% level) from the proportion for the World Bank 
Institute (WBI).  (When relevant, all significance tests reported are based on robust standard 7 
 
errors.) However, the difference between sectoral VPUs is striking with only 36% of WBI staff 
rating their familiarity over 5, as compared to 81% in HDN and 71% in PRM. 
A potential source of bias is suggested by the fact that the two VPUs with the highest 
response rate also had the highest familiarity with WB research, namely HDN and PRM 
(comparing Tables 1 and 2). The overall correlation coefficient between response rate and mean 
familiarity across the 12 VPUs is 0.65. However, re-weighting the data to accord with the 
population proportions (the numbers of people invited across VPUs in Table 1) only reduces 
slightly the mean familiarity score, to 5.66 as compared to 5.74 for the un-weighted data. While 
there is clearly some sample selection bias, it appears to be modest. There may well be a bias 
within VPUs based on other unobserved factors, though this cannot be assessed. The rest of this 
paper will rely mainly on the un-weighted data.  
The differences in the extent to which different VPUs draw on the Bank’s research can be 
expected to reflect differences in their staffing.  As noted, WB research is dominated by 
economic analysis. Some VPUs have hired more staff trained in research, as indicated by a PhD 
(in any subject), and some rely more on economists. Low demand for WB research might stem 
from high internal capacity for research in a VPU. Alternatively, internal capacity for research 
may enhance the unit’s absorptive capacity for learning and innovation (as postulated by Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990).
12 Internal capacity reduces search costs and creates the kinds of overlaps in 
knowledge that facilitate the assimilation of new knowledge from external sources.  
The idea of absorptive capacity from the literature on industrial organization is consistent 
with what we see when we look at how the incidence of senior staff with a PhD and the share of 
―economists‖ vary across VPUs.
13 On comparing the proportion of PhDs with the mean 
familiarity scores in Table 2 one finds a correlation coefficient of 0.66 while it is 0.54 for the % 
above 5; these are significant at the 1% and 2% levels respectively.  There is an even higher 
correlation across VPUs between average familiarity with WB research and the share of staff that 
have ―Economist‖ in their job title (Table 1). The correlation coefficients between the ratio of 
                                                           
12   Following Cohen and Levinthal (1990), the literature on innovation within firms has emphasized the role of 
internal knowledge and its diffusion; see, for example, Fabrizio (2009), which provides evidence using firm-level 
data that in-house research capacity reduces search costs for new innovations.   
13   The calculation of the share of PhDs for GG+ staff was for 2009. The number of ―economists‖ is measured 
by the number of staff who have the word ―economist‖ in their job title. This excludes managers. 8 
 
economists to senior staff (sent the survey) and the mean score for familiarity is 0.84, while the 
correlation with the % above 5 is 0.75; these are both significant at the 1% level. It appears that 
economists and staff with a PhD play a key role in the diffusion process for WB research 
throughout the institution.
14  
An objective measure of demand for WB research is found in the intra-Bank financial 
flows designated as (paid) ―cross-support.‖ Each of the research staff in DECRG is required to 
sell a minimum of 13 weeks of their time per year to other units, almost all of which are in 
operations, either regional units or network anchors.
15 This arrangement exists in part to help 
assure that researchers are exposed to the problems and challenges faced in the Bank’s 
operational settings in the hope that this will generate relevant research, but also that operational 
staff will learn to better appreciate the gains from research. TTLs in operations typically come to 
the researchers with a specific task, such as supervising new data collection or undertaking 
analytic work for an analytic product, called ―AAA.‖  
Table 1 gives the three-year mean cross-support provided by DECRG to each VPU. 
When deflated by the number of GG+ staff, the ―cross-support per capita‖ is correlated with the 
mean familiarity scores across VPUs; the correlation coefficient is 0.53 (which is significant at 
the 1% level).  Cross-support is also higher to VPUs with a higher share of PhDs (r=0.74) and 
more economists per capita (r=0.79). 
The differences between the Bank’s sectors come out sharply in Table 3.
16 Over 80% of 
responding staff in the Poverty unit of PRM rate themselves as highly familiar with WB 
research, with a mean score of almost 7. Yet less than one third of those in the Energy and 
Mining (EM) and Urban Development (URB) had high familiarity. There is a clear tendency for 
lower familiarity with WB research amongst the Bank’s traditional ―infrastructure‖ sectors—
agriculture and rural development, energy and mining, urban development, transport—than the 
                                                           
14   This is consistent with the role economists have played in the diffusion of economic policy ideas more 
generally (Kogut and Macpherson, 2011).   
15   The total of this paid cross-support amounts to over 20 person years per year of direct support by 
researchers. However, that is still a very small share of the Bank’s staff—the total paid cross-support supplied by the 
Bank’s research department is only around 0.3% of all Bank staff. Indeed, only 1% of which are in the only 
department dedicated to research, although research is also done in other units. 
16   ARD, EM, ENV, SDV. TRN and URB all map to SDN; EP, POV and PSG map to PRM; EDU, HNP and 
SP map to HDN. Some sectors were not explicitly identified by the survey, such as Gender. Note that the 
aforementioned data on PhDs, economists and cross-support are only available at VPU level, not by sectors.  9 
 
newer ―economic and human development sectors‖ (economic policy, poverty, education, health 
and nutrition, and social protection). The mean score for ARD, EM, TRN and URB is 5.19 
(s.e.=0.24) as compared to 6.48 (0.14) for EP, EDU, HNP, POV and SP (and the difference is 
significant; t=4.66). The corresponding proportions of staff with a high familiarity score (over 5) 
are 44.58% (5.47%) and 70.68% (3.30%). In all, 41 staff in the ―hard sectors‖ (ARD, EM, TRN 
and URB) gave a score of 6 or more, while 279 did so in the sample as a whole. Thus the hard 
sectors accounted for 15% of the staff with high familiarity. By contrast, these sectors accounted 
for 45% of Bank lending.
17 
Table 3 also gives my estimates of the allocation of DECRG’s staff (including managers) 
across sectors.
18 Mean familiarity amongst operational staff is positively correlated with 
DECRG’s staffing, with a correlation coefficient of 0.527 (t=2.85; prob.=0.016).  The positive 
correlation is consistent with the view that staffing of DECRG matters to familiarity with 
research amongst the Bank’s operational staff. The marked difference in familiarity with 
research seen in Table 3 match the allocation of staff in DECRG. The sectors ARD, EM, TRN 
and URB account for 14.9% of staff in the research department, as compared to 59.1% for EP, 
EDU, HNP, POV and SP.  
The survey also asked for a rating (also on a 10-point scale) of other sources of research 
besides the Bank.
19 The two most important sources for Bank operational staff are likely to be 
academia and external consultants. Tables 2 and 3 also give the mean scores by VPU and sector 
respectively. In both cases, the mean scores tend to be positively correlated with ratings of 
familiarity with the Bank’s internal research.
20 This is also true across staff, with a positive 
correlation between ratings of familiarity with WB research and ratings of both academia and 
                                                           
17   Based on aggregates for the last three years for lending on ―agriculture, fishing and forestry,‖ ―energy and 
mining,‖ ―transportation‖ and ―water, sanitation and flood protection‖; the sectoral breakdown of Bank lending can 
be found in World Bank (2011); the relevant tabulation is here. 
18   I did this by allocating each staff member a primary and secondary sector in 2011—based on their research 
outputs—and giving two-thirds weight to the former. This requires a degree of judgment, but the allocation proved 
relatively easy. Note that the high proportion of staff in ―economic policy‖ might be somewhat deceptive, since 
these are often researchers who are relatively fungible, and work across many development topics. 
19   The specific question was as follows: “When considering all the sources of research globally, how useful is 
each of the following in terms of its research and knowledge have a positive impact on the quality of your AAA 
and/or lending operations?” 
20   Across sectors there is a very high correlation between familiarity with Bank research and ratings of 
academia (r=0.81). It is less strong for consultants but still positive (r=0.31). 10 
 
external consultants, though only significant for academia.
21 It does not appear to be the case that 
the sectors and staff that know less about the Bank’s own research tend to value these external 
sources more highly.  
Why then do we see these differences in familiarity with WB research? It might be 
argued that they just reflect the nature of the work done by operational staff in different sectors. 
By this view, staff in the ―hard infrastructure sectors‖ do not need the Bank’s research as much 
as in the ―social sectors.‖ To paraphrase an argument I have heard: “We all know that roads are 
good for development and we don’t need economic analysis to confirm that; what we need is to 
make sure that the roads meet sound engineering standards.” It is hard to say what validity 
should be attached to this view. There are clearly differences in the nature of the knowledge 
needed by staff in different sectors. But the need for research is surely common between the 
―hard‖ and ―soft‖ sectors. Economic analysis is important in formulating strategies and policies 
for infrastructure, notably in assessing the effectiveness of lending operations (both ex ante and 
ex post) and in devising sound pricing and investment policies.  And the trade-offs invariably 
faced by governments between building roads and schools (say) must be informed by economic 
analysis. The uneven familiarity with WB research across sectors evident in Table 3 is not easily 
justified from the point of view of sound development policy and WB lending.  
It might be conjectured that the fact that economics is the dominant discipline in Bank 
research makes that research less relevant to some sectors. As discussed above, this does not 
seem credible as an explanation for why Bank research is used less in the traditional 
infrastructure sectors. Nor does it fit well with the fact that staff in Health, Nutrition and 
Population (HNP)—dominated by non-economists—are very familiar with research (Table 3). 
Possibly the idea has more salience for the Social Development (SDV) sector, which uses non-
economics social sciences more than economics. (Note that SDV has the third lowest mean 
familiarity score in Table 3.) This division of labor is not, however, exogenous, but has evolved 
in a path-dependent way through hiring decisions. And it can change, albeit slowly. For example, 
DECRG’s latest Policy Research Report (its flagship publication) is a substantial evaluative 
study, done by two economists, of the main lending instruments used by SDV operations 
                                                           
21   The correlation coefficients between individual ratings for familiarity with WB research and academia is 
0.37 (significant at the 0.1% level) and 0.09 (only significant at the 12% level) respectively. 11 
 
(Mansuri and Rao, 2011). This report stemmed from demands from operations for more 
knowledge about the impacts of these interventions.    
To get an idea of how demand for research amongst operational staff is changing, the 
survey also asked: “To what extent do you currently rely on Bank research for your work?” and 
“To what extent do you expect to rely on Bank research for your work in the next few years?” 
Again, respondents were presented with a 10 point scale, this time from ―not at all‖ (1) to ―very 
much‖ (10). Figure 2 gives the density functions for responses. The responses on current reliance 
on WB research are strikingly bi-modal, with a ―low-usage‖ mode around 3 and a high-usage 
mode around 7. The overall mean response is 5.40 and the median is 6, though this might be 
considered deceptive given the bi-modality. If we define the low-reliance and high-reliance 
groups as those with a score of 5 or lower versus 6+ this splits the sample almost equally, with 
50.91% in the high group.  
Equally striking is the fact that the lower mode largely vanishes when one turns to the 
second question, about future reliance on WB research (Figure 2). This reflects a noticeably 
higher expected future reliance on WB research than for the past. This is consistent with the view 
that the WB is becoming a ―Knowledge Bank.‖ But it might also be a psychological effect—a 
―New Year’s resolution‖ effect—whereby staff hope to learn more from research. 
Those who have used WB research in the past are more likely to expect to use it in the 
future; the correlation coefficient is 0.87 (significant at better than the 0.1% level). (With 
controls for years of service, location, VPU and sector the correlation is 0.85, and similarly 
significant.) One possibility is that staff learn about how useful research can be, creating 
persistence; another possibility is that the correlation stems from time-invariant characteristics of 
respondents, whereby some are intrinsically more attracted to research. 
Figure 3 plots responses to the question on expected future reliance on WB research 
against that for past reliance. (In both cases, the scatter plot controls for respondent 
characteristics, namely years of service, location, VPU and sector.) While we see a strong 
positive relationship, the overall slope is less than unity. (The straight line in Figure 3 is the 45 
degree line, while the other line is the non-parametric regression line of best fit.) Across 
individual staff, the regression coefficient of the expected increase in demand (future less 12 
 
current) on the current reliance on research is -0.175 (s.e.=0.027). This suggests that the 
disparities in usage of research can be expected to decline over time, interpretable as 
―convergence.‖ 
It is of interest to look more closely at where this expected increase in demand for WB 
research is coming from. Tables 4 and 5 give the summary statistics across VPUs and sectors 
respectively. The VPU for which demand for research is expected to rise most on average is 
MNA while the lowest expected increase is for PRM. MNA is also the regional VPU with 
highest mean score for current reliance on research. The sector where demand is expected to 
increase most is EM while the lowest is SP. In both cases there is a tendency for the units that 
currently rely less on WB research to expect larger growth in usage in the future; the correlation 
coefficients between the expected increase and current levels are -0.32 and -0.22 across VPU and 
sectors respectively.  
However, it remains that expected future reliance on WB research is significantly lower 
for the sectors with low current familiarity and use. The mean score for future reliance on 
research for staff in the seven sectors with lowest mean familiarity scores in Table 3—namely 
ARD, EM, ENV, PSG, SDV, TRN and URB—is 5.55 (s.e.=0.21) as compared to 6.29 
(s.e.=0.14) for all other staff and the difference is significant at the 0.3% level (t=2.96).
22 
Confining attention to the traditional ―hard sectors‖ (ARD, EM, TRN and URB) their mean 
expected future reliance on research is 5.34 (0.28) as compared to 6.72 (0.16) for EP, EDU, 
HNP, POV and SP (and the difference is significant; t=4.31). Even with the signs of convergence 
we have seen, the hard sectors can be expected to persist in their relatively low reliance on 
research for their work.    
4.  Accessing research within the Bank 
How do the Bank’s practitioners obtain the research they use?  In addition to papers and 
reports, there are learning programs, seminars, formal and informal contacts with researchers, 
and formal and informal networks. The survey data on self-assessed familiarity with Bank 
                                                           
22   All but one of these sectors is mapped to SDN; the mean future reliance scores are 5.49 (s.e.=0.23) and 
6.25 (0.14) for SDN and non-SDN sectors, and the difference is significant (t=2.85). Note that the staff in sectors 
mapped to SDN need not be in the SDN VPU; many are in regional units. However, there is very little difference in 
the score between staff in these sectors who are in the SDN VPU versus other VPUs; the mean scores are 5.52 and 
5.47 respectively (and the difference is not significant; t=0.09). It is a ―sector effect‖ rather than VPU effect. 13 
 
research analyzed above offer a way of assessing how well these various channels are 
performing. This reveals some sources of friction in the diffusion process for research findings. 
The Bank has a dedicated formal expenditure item for ―learning.‖ This is mainly staff 
time devoted to attending various internal learning events. Tabulations are available of the 
expenditures devoted to learning by VPU. I find that the expenditure per staff member in 2010-
11 is uncorrelated with familiarity scores across VPUs; the correlation coefficients are 0.01 and 
0.11 for the mean score and the % of 5+.
23 So this does not appear to be an important channel for 
learning about the findings from WB research. However, there is likely to be some noise in these 
data, due to errors in time-recording by staff. 
The survey asked the following question that gets at a broader range of channels for 
learning: “When obtaining research from the World Bank, how frequently do you get the 
research from:…” Respondents were then presented with a list of options and a 10-point scale.  
Table 6 summarizes survey responses. The most highly-rated sources of WB research are 
―reports or papers,‖ the Bank’s intranet, flagship reports, and the Bank’s main working paper 
series. Seminars etc., and authored reports are close behind. The lowest rated source (on average) 
is ―DECRG researcher cross-support.‖  
Arguably a better way of thinking about the relative importance of these various sources 
of knowledge is to ask how well they predict the respondents’ own assessments of their 
familiarity with WB research. Staff may use source A more frequently than B (with hence a 
higher score for A in the survey response) yet B has the stronger impact on familiarity with 
research. For example, when a researcher provides cross-support to a TTL in operations, he or 
she will probably get a deeper understanding and appreciation of the contributions of research to 
operational work than reading a final research product that is less distantly related to the needs of 
that person. The TTL may read more papers, but the cross-support has greater impact. 
To explore this alternative interpretation, Table 7 gives a regression of the familiarity 
scores on the scores for sources of knowledge. I include controls for location, sector and VPU; 
filtering out these sources of heterogeneity helps in identifying the relationship in the data.  In 
explaining the differences in overall familiarity with WB research, the use of DECRG 
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researchers in cross-support now emerges as the most important factor, with both the highest 
regression coefficient and the most significant.  Also important are informal discussions with 
researchers and journal articles, though the latter variable is only significant at the 12% level. 
(The results were similar if one dropped the controls for years of service and VPU/sector.)  The 
direct (formal and informal) interactions with DECRG researchers (including cross-support) 
have high weights in affecting familiarity with WB research, even though they score relatively 
poorly in the mean ratings for frequency of their use given in Table 6. 
Similarly to other large organizations, the Bank has created official ―networks.‖ (Recall 
that these map 1-to-1 with ―sectors‖ in the Bank’s matrix structure.) The networks are intended 
to play a key role in linking sources of knowledge (including WB research) with practitioners 
within the Bank. How well do they serve this function? The survey asked: ―To what extent does 
the network that you belong to help you navigate the World Bank’s body of research and 
researchers when you request information?” Again, respondents were asked to answer on a 10 
point scale from 1=―Not at all‖ to 10=―Very much.‖  The mean response was 4.86 and the 
median was 5. The modal value was 1; 15% of respondents gave this answer.  
The differences across sectors can be seen in Table 8.  The most highly rated sector is 
education, for which 70% of those mapped to the sector rated its performance as a 6 or higher, as 
compared to 42% for all staff. The next highest in terms of mean score is HNP, with POV 
coming third; the sector with the lowest mean score is ENV, followed by SDV. 
Having a network that performs poorly adds friction to the diffusion process for Bank 
research. This is evident in the fact that the performance ratings of the networks are positively 
correlated with familiarity with research. This is clear from comparing the sector means in 
Tables 3 and 8; the correlation coefficient between mean scores is 0.508. Across all respondents 
the correlation coefficient is 0.230 (which is statistically significant at the 0.1% level).  
The in-house research department (DECRG) is the key unit aiming to supply relevant 
research findings to Bank operations, but there are differing views about its success in this role. 
The survey asked:  
“Which of the following statements best represents your views about research at the 
Bank: (1) I would find it more valuable and useful if the institution were to out-source 15 
 
more of its research; (2)  I would find it more valuable and useful if the institution 
committed more resources to research within an in-house research department.” 
Over the whole sample, 63.0% supported option (2), for more resources for in-house research. 
The VPU with the lowest support was ECA, with 56.6% support, and, the highest was WBI at 
85.7%.  However, excluding WBI, the inter-VPU differences are not statistically significant at 
the 5% level.  Across sectors, the lowest support for in-house research is again EM, with only 
40.0% supportive, while the highest was the EP sector, for which 82.2% of respondents preferred 
option (2), followed closely by POV (81.5%).    
Those who are more familiar with and rely more on WB research tend to be more 
supportive of higher resources being devoted to in-house research. With the same set of controls, 
the correlation coefficient between support for the in-house research department and current 
reliance on research is 0.40. A similar pattern is found for familiarity with research, though the 
correlation coefficient was lower at r=0.23. An even stronger correlation is found between 
support for in-house research and expected future reliance on WB research (r=0.49).  
Table 9 gives the Probit regression coefficients for the probability of supporting the in-
house research department (i.e., picking (2) above). Controlling for years, location, VPU and 
sector, support for greater resources for the research department is greater among those who rate 
highly the technical quality and policy relevance of WB research, those who think it helps with 
AAA. It also tends to be greater for those who have a less favorable view of external consultants.  
The direct responsiveness of the research department to operational demands is a 
potentially important channel for knowledge diffusion in an organization such as the World 
Bank, but how well does it work? The survey asked two questions about the experiences of staff 
in working with DEC, namely: ―To what extent are researchers at DEC responsive to your 
needs?” and “To what extent are DEC researchers responsive and available for cross support?” 
Again, a 10-point scale was used from 1=―Not at all‖ to 10=―To a very high degree.‖ For the 
first question there was also an option for “Depends on the researcher; some are responsive, 
some are not.” Since a minimum amount of (paid) cross support is mandatory for DECRG 
researchers, the degree of ―responsiveness‖ will undoubtedly depend in part on whether the 
researcher in question is above or below the minimum (set at 13 weeks per year). So there is 
likely to be some random variability depending on when the researchers are approached. Figure 16 
 
4 gives the density functions for scores 1-10. Again we see signs of bi-modality, with a larger 
sub-group of staff centered around an answer of 7-8 and a smaller mass centered around 2-3. The 
mean and median responses to the first question on a 10-point scale were 5.80 and 6 respectively 
with n=241 (there is a large number of missing values for both these questions). 12.9% of 
respondents gave the answer “Depends on the researcher.” The mean and median for the second 
were 5.47 and 6 respectively (n=254).  
Tables 10 and 11 give the breakdown of these indicators across VPUs and sectors.  The 
proportion rating DEC researchers as 5+ on their responsiveness varies from 50% in OPC to 
100% in WBI. The proportion with 5+ for availability for cross-support varies from 36% in 
South Asia to 79% in ECA.  The differences across sectors in assessments of DEC 
responsiveness are particularly striking, with only 20% for staff in SDV rating responsiveness as 
high, compared to 90% of staff in POV, with EP close behind at 86%. 
The survey asked about other factors relevant to demand for research, notably its 
relevance, accessibility and timeliness. (Each category was given an explanation in the survey 
instrument.
24) And again a 10 point scale was used. Figure 5 gives the densities. A marked 
bimodality is evident for ―relevance‖ and (less so) ―accessibility‖ and the answers to these 
questions were highly correlated (r=0.74). ―Timeliness‖ is distributed somewhat differently 
though still correlated with the other measures (r=0.72 for both relevance and access). The mean 
score on relevance was 5.80 (n=445), 6.12 (n=449) on access and 5.25 (n=383) for timeliness, 
which appears to be the more important constraint on demand for research. Research takes time, 
and often requires a longer time horizon than development projects allow.  
5.  The value of research in operational work 
The incentive to learn about the Bank’s research is greatest when it is perceived to be of 
high value to operational staff in their work. The survey asked: “please rate the overall value of 
World Bank research for your work, on a scale of 1-10 where 1 means not valuable at all, 10 
means extremely valuable.” And again respondents were presented with a 10 point scale where 
1=‖not valuable at all‖ and 10=‖extremely valuable.‖ Figure 6 gives the densities of responses to 
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use‖ and ―timeliness‖ was qualified as ―the research was delivered in the necessary time frame to allow you to 
integrate into AAA and/or lending operation.‖ 17 
 
the ―value‖ question. We see a marked bi-modality, with a high value mode around 7-8 and a 
low value mode around 3. The mean score is 5.61 and the median is 6. The density function in 
Figure 6 suggests that a score of 5 is reasonable as the lower bound in defining the ―high-value‖ 
group. We find that 65.5% of respondents attached high value to WB research. 
Sample selection bias is inflating these numbers, though the effect appears to be modest 
when one corrects for the variation in response rates across VPUs. This adjustment brings the 
mean assessed value down to 5.54 from 5.61. While this is small, there may well be a larger bias 
stemming from latent differences between staff within a given VPU. 
There are marked differences in the value attached to research across VPUs and sectors. 
Tables 12 and 13 give the summary statistics. The VPU that attaches the lowest average value to 
WB research is SDN, with a mean score of 5, and 55% of respondents giving a rating of 5 or 
more. The VPU with the highest value attached to WB research is WBI, with an average score of 
7, and all the WBI respondents rated WB research highly. The next highest is PRM, with a mean 
score of 6.5. The sectoral VPUs generally put higher value on research than the regional VPUs. 
The regional VPU with the highest mean score is (again) MNA. 
The traditional ―hard infrastructure‖ sectors tend to put lower average value on research 
for their work, suggesting lower incentives to learn about WB research. The mean score for 
ARD, EM, TRN and URB is 4.82 (0.41) as compared to 6.27 (0.27) for EP, EDU, HNP, POV 
and SP; the difference is significant (t=2.94).  The sector for which staff attach the lowest value 
to WB research for their work is EM (a mean score of 4.1, with only 41% rating it highly), 
followed by TRN, URB and ARD. The sector with the highest mean value is the poverty sector 
within PRM, with a mean score of 7 and for which 93% of respondents rated WB research highly 
in terms of its value for their work. 
How then are staff distributed across the four categories identified in the introduction?  
The following table gives the breakdown for the 519 responses with complete information.
25  We 
see that amongst those respondents who feel that WB research is important for their work 
roughly two-thirds have ―high‖ familiarity with WB research products.  The independently well-
informed are a relatively small group. Amongst those with low perceived familiarity with 
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research slightly less than half put low value on research for their work, while the rest (one 
quarter of all respondents) think research is valuable, and are clearly are not getting enough of it. 
    Perceived value of WB research for the staff member’s work 

























The ―frustrated uninformed‖ can be thought of as a target group for extra effort at 
research dissemination. So it is of interest to see where they are found. Tables 14 and 15 give the 
VPU and sectoral distributions of the four types of staff.  WBI has (by far) the highest share of 
the ―frustrated uninformed‖ staff, with 65% in this category, the rest being ―functionally well-
informed‖—both valuing research for their work and familiar with it, who comprise 42% of 
respondents.
26 The MNA region has the lowest, as 13%. Breaking it down by sectors, it is 
transport staff that have the highest share of ―frustrated uninformed‖ group, at 35%, with URB 
and SDV close behind. EDU has the lowest, at 9%.  The share of ―functionally well-informed‖ 
varies from 35% in SDN to 63% in PRM, while amongst sectors it varies from 14% in energy 
and mining to 83% in the poverty sector.  
A closer look at the ―happily uninformed‖ does not suggest that they have simply 
switched their favors to external (non-WB) sources of research. They give a relatively low rating 
to academia as a source—a mean score of 5.53, as compared to 6.87 for all other staff, and the 
difference is significant at the 0.1% level.  They also rate consultants lower than average, at a 
mean of 6.07 as compared to 6.54 for the rest, and the difference is significant at the 5% level.  
At the same time they have an above average desire to increase their use of the Bank’s research; 
their mean difference between expected future usage and past usage (both on the 10-point scale) 
is 0.80 versus 0.54 for the rest of the staff and 0.43 for the ―functionally well-informed.‖ (The 
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then the % of the sample are deemed to be ―functionally well-informed‖ falls from 42% to 38%. 19 
 
former difference is only significant at the 13% level, but the latter makes it at 3%.) Evidently 
the ―happily uninformed‖ are not entirely happy with the status quo. 
6.  Does an incentive to learn translate into knowledge? 
Attaching a high value to research for one’s work need not translate into actual 
knowledge about research. That link will be broken if the Bank’s internal research organization 
is unresponsive, or its products inaccessible.  
However, the evidence suggests that stronger incentives for learning do generally 
translate into higher investment by staff in learning, as reflected in the familiarity with research. 
Those respondents who put a higher value on research for their work are more likely to be 
familiar with it, as can be seen in Figure 7 (with the same set of controls used earlier). The (non-
parametric) regression line shows a persistent increase over the whole range of familiarity scores. 
If we focus solely on those respondents who believe they have a high familiarity with WB 
research—again a score of 6 or more—then the mean assessed value is 6.53 (s.e.=0.14), as 
compared to 4.49 (0.14) for those who acknowledge they are not very familiar with research; the 
difference is highly significant (t=10.22). Amongst those familiar with research, 69.2% rated it 
of high overall value (s.e.=2.8%), compared to 35.4% (3.1%) for those relatively unfamiliar.  
How much does familiarity with research respond to stronger incentives to learn? The 
regression coefficient of the familiarity score on the value score is 0.45 (with a standard error of 
0.036).  Going from a 1 to a 10 on perceived value of research for one’s work translates into a 
mean increment of four levels for familiarity. Table 16 gives regressions for familiarity scores 
with controls. The first specification uses only the controls for years of experience, its squared 
value, location, sector and VPU, while the second includes the assessed value of research for the 
respondent’s work, as the measure of incentives for learning. (I return to the third.) 
Allowing for differing incentives for learning more than doubles the share of the variance 
in familiarity with research that is explained by the controls alone. With the controls, the 
regression coefficient on the incentive variable falls slightly, to 0.421. A one standard deviation 
increase in the value attached to research adds about one half of a standard deviation to the 20 
 
familiarity score.
27 About half of the gap between the mean familiarity scores for ARD, EM, 
TRN and URB (on the one hand) and EP, EDU, HNP, POV and SP (on the other) is accounted 
for by the difference in the value attached to research by staff working in these sectors.
28   
In interpreting these findings, one can view the glass as half empty or half full. The fact 
that knowledge responds to incentives for learning suggests that the internal system for research 
and its diffusion is working to create internal absorptive capacity.  But the fact that the regression 
coefficient is significantly less than unity is also suggestive of frictions in the process.  (Figure 7 
also shows the 45 degree line.) 
It may well be that the responses to the ―value‖ question are picking up a latent 
characteristic of respondents whereby some operational staff are just naturally ―research 
consumers‖—they are more interested in research and seek it out more avidly even when their 
incentive for learning (as part of their job) is low. This would cast doubt on the interpretation of 
the ―value‖ question as indicating the respondent’s incentive for learning about Bank research. 
The survey also asked respondents to rate academia as a source of research relevant to their 
work. This is likely to pick up the ―research consumer‖ attribute. So too is the respondent’s 
rating of ―informal discussions with researchers‖ as a source of knowledge about research. 
Column (3) of Table 16 gives the regression with these two extra controls. Both are significant, 
and the coefficient on value falls to 0.30, but it is still significantly positive and significantly less 
than unity, again suggestive of frictions.    
Separately to these effects, familiarity with WB research also varies with years of service 
and this effect is markedly nonlinear. Familiarity rises with years of service up to 16 years (18 
years using the specification in Column 3), and falls after that. The median years of service is 10; 
20% of respondents had more than 16 years of service. 
There is also a difference in familiarity with WB research between those based at the 
Bank’s head-quarters in Washington DC (where the research department is located) and those in 
the field offices in developing countries; 65% of respondents were in the former group, versus 
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28   Recall that the difference in mean familiarity scores is 1.29. Given that the difference in mean value 
attached to research for their work is 1.43, this implies a difference in mean familiarity with research of 0.60. 21 
 
34% in field offices (the remaining 1% were in WB offices in developed countries, mainly 
Europe).  The fact that familiarity is lower for those in country offices suggests that the advances 
in communication technology—the WB has a well-developed ―intranet‖ to facilitate this—have 
not eliminated the advantages of physical proximity.  
It is of interest to look for other evidence for or against the view that stronger incentives 
for learning translate into knowledge. An objective clue to how much the Bank’s internal system 
for knowledge management responds to differences in the incentive for learning can be found in 
how the demand for paid cross-support from the Bank’s research department varies with answers 
to the value question. Across VPUs, the mean score for the value of WB research is highly 
correlated with the per capita demand for cross-support from DECRG (using the data in Tables 1 
and 12); the correlation coefficients between the three-year mean of cross-support per staff 
member GG+ and the mean value score is 0.72, and it is also 0.72 with the proportion of VPU 
staff giving a value core over 5. This is consistent with the view that incentives for learning in 
the Bank do generate a response.  
7.  Conclusions 
  One can think of two stylized models of how research is used by development 
practitioners. In the first, they have a demand for knowledge that does not stem from its direct 
bearing on their work. Much development research is a public good. Practitioners might read 
research findings to better understand the world in which they work, even when that 
understanding is essentially irrelevant to the specifics of that work. Alternatively, in the second 
model, research has a direct value in the work of practitioners—such as by informing project 
choices at the entry stage and assessing impacts later on—and research findings are sufficiently 
relevant and accessible to assure that practitioners become well informed. To enhance the quality 
of development aid, we hope that the second model is the best characterization. But is it?  
If it was true in general that research findings are largely consumed independently of 
their direct bearing on the work of development practitioners then we would not expect greater 
familiarity with research findings to be associated with a higher perceived value of research for 
the practitioners’ work, or higher stated reliance on research for that work. Indeed, given that 22 
 
there are heterogeneous costs of learning, those most familiar with research findings need not 
overlap much at all with those who value research most for their work. 
But that is not what we see in these survey data. Two-thirds of the responding senior staff 
put a high value on the Bank’s research for their work. They appear to have a reasonably strong 
incentive to learn, though stronger for some than others. Operational staff with a stronger 
incentive to learn tend to be more familiar with Bank research. Only 12% of staff fall into the 
category of ―independently well-informed‖—those who report high familiarity with research, but 
attach low value to it for their work. The Bank’s senior staff are mainly found in three other 
groups. The first are those who are ―happily uninformed‖ about research—they attach low value 
to it for their own work, and report correspondingly low familiarity with research; 23% of senior 
staff fall into this group. A second group puts a high value on Bank research but its members are 
not generally successful in accessing that research or find it of limited relevance. This group is 
not evenly spread across Bank units and sectors, suggesting that there may be scope for a 
targeted effort at research and its dissemination. The third and largest group is the ―functionally 
well-informed,‖ comprising 42% of staff. They put a high value on research for their work (a 
mean score of almost 8 on a scale of 1-10) and are (by their own assessment) quite familiar with 
research findings (also a mean score of 8 on a scale of 1-10).  
While this paper’s results are consistent with the view that stronger incentives for leaning 
about research translate into greater knowledge, they are also suggestive of some significant 
frictions. The slope of the relationship between perceived value and familiarity with research—
the effect of an increment to perceived value on familiarity, both on a 1-10 scale—is positive but 
significantly less than unity, suggesting frictions in how the incentive for learning translates into 
knowledge. The responsiveness of researchers and the timeliness and accessibility of their 
outputs are clearly important to how much learning incentives lead to useful knowledge.    
  There are some marked differences across Bank units. Staff working in the economic 
policy and human development sectors tend to be both more familiar with the Bank’s research 
and attach higher value to it than do others, notably in the more traditional areas of the Bank’s 
lending, such as agriculture, energy and mining, transport and urban development, which account 
for just under half of Bank lending. For example, while only 7% of senior staff members 
working on poverty and 10% of those mapped to economic policy are ―happily uninformed,‖ the 23 
 
proportion rises to 37% for staff working on urban development and 41% of staff in the energy 
and mining sector.  
The differences across units in the demand for the Bank’s research are correlated with the 
incidence of PhDs and economists, suggesting that internal research capacity in operational units 
helps create absorptive capacity for knowledge in those units. The Bank’s more formal networks 
also play a role in the research diffusion process, especially in the economic policy, poverty and 
human development sectors; however, staff working in the traditional sectors tend to give lower 
ratings to their networks in their performance in helping them connect to research. 
What gives rise to these inter-sectoral differences? Both demand- and supply-side factors 
have clearly played a role. Staff working in the traditional sectors may well have turned away 
from Bank research in part because they have found it to be of little relevance to their needs, 
though they also put relatively low value on research sources outside the Bank. Today’s research 
priorities may well be poorly matched with the issues faced by practitioners in these sectors. For 
example, the current emphasis on randomized trials in development economics has arguably 
distorted knowledge even further away from the hard infrastructure sectors where these tools 
have less applicability (Ravallion, 2009). Making the supply of research more relevant to the 
needs of development practitioners would undoubtedly help. 
However, this is an incomplete explanation, since the supply of research is clearly also 
determined by demand. In turn, demand stems in no small measure from the extent to which 
―development impact‖ is challenged by donors. Impact often appears to be taken for granted in 
the traditional hard infrastructure sectors (though in truth the evidence is often rather weak, given 
relatively low levels of investment in ex-post evaluations). This stands in marked contrast to the 
social sectors where lending and policy operations have had to work hard to justify themselves, 
and have drawn more heavily on research to do that; the large body of research on poverty and 
human development in developing countries that emerged in the last 15 years is indicative of this 
longer-term shift in priorities. Clearly, if the presumption of ―impact‖ is routinely challenged by 
donors, aid organizations and citizens then project staff will face strong incentives for learning 
about impact. And (as this paper has shown) strong incentives for learning yield greater 
familiarity and use of research.     24 
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  Figure 1: Density functions for self-rated familiarity with World Bank research 
 
 
Figure 2: Density functions for current and expected future reliance on WB research 
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Figure 3: Those who have relied on WB research before are more likely to expect to return  
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 Figure 5: Densities for relevance, accessibility and timeliness of WB research 
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Figure 7: The more valuable research is to the staff member’s work the more familiar they 
are with research 
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Table 1: Number of staff invited to participate and response rate by Vice-Presidencies 
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Regional VPUs             
Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR)  651  15.8  46.9  57  764  1174 
East Asia and Pacific (EAP)  349  18.6  44.5  31  460  1318 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA)  337  19.0  49.4 
43 
303  900 
Latin America and Caribbean 
(LCR)  309  24.6  55.0 
42 
553  1790 
Middle East and North Africa 
(MNA)  203  12.3  48.4 
25 
281  1383 
South Asia (SAR)  331  15.7  46.8  22  429  1296 
“Sectoral” VPUs             
Finance and Private Sector (FPD)  114  16.7  38.0  8  189  1661 
Human Development (HDN)  77  31.2  61.5  38  111  1437 
Operational Policy (OPC)  83  21.7  49.7  10  32  386 
Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management (PRM)  76  50.0  75.4 
56 
332  4368 
Sustainable Development (SDN)  293  14.3  42.3  11  374  1278 
World Bank Institute (WBI)  75  17.3  54.9  11  81  1084 
Development Economics (DEC)  0  n.a.  77.2  110  n.a.  n.a. 
Total  2898  19.2  40.6*  945*  4193  1447 
Note: VPU is missing for some observations. These are included in the total count. * Includes all units not identified 
above. 
 Table 2: Summary statistics on familiarity with WB research across Vice-Presidencies 
Vice-Presidency  Average familiarity 
with research (10 point 
scale) 
High familiarity with 
research (% above 5 on 
scale)  
Rating of academia as 
source of research 
globally 
Rating of external 
consultants as source 
of research globally 
  Mean  St. error  Mean  St. error  Mean  St. error  Mean  St. error 
Regional VPUs                 
Sub-Saharan Africa  5.67  0.21  52.13  5.21  6.19  0.25  6.31  0.23 
East Asia and Pacific  5.31  0.27  44.62  6.24  6.62  0.28  6.32  0.26 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  5.41  0.29  47.46  6.58  6.38  0.29  6.87  0.22 
Latin America and Caribbean  5.34  0.24  49.32  5.92  6.84  0.26  6.62  0.24 
Middle East and North Africa  6.13  0.44  66.67  9.74  6.81  0.41  6.71  0.29 
South Asia  5.88  0.30  60.00  7.01  6.22  0.31  6.00  0.32 
“Sectoral” VPUs                 
Finance and Private Sector   5.50  0.56  50.00  11.92  6.80  0.62  6.80  0.60 
Human Development  7.33  0.45  80.95  8.67  8.10  0.42  7.00  0.54 
Operational Policy   5.41  0.58  47.06  12.25  7.38  0.45  6.62  0.48 
Poverty Reduction and Econ. Mgt.   6.89  0.42  71.43  7.73  6.97  0.38  6.25  0.44 
Sustainable Development   5.63  0.42  50.00  8.00  6.17  0.37  6.30  0.35 
World Bank Institute   5.18  0.88  36.36  14.68  6.29  0.44  6.43  0.79 
Total  5.74  0.10  53.76  2.19  6.59  0.10  6.44  0.10 
Note: the totals include some other VPUs with insufficient sample sizes. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics on familiarity with WB research across sectors 





with research (10 
point scale) 
High familiarity with 
research (% above 5 on 
scale 
Rating of academia 
as source of 
research globally 
Rating of external 
consultants as 
source of research 
globally 
  Mean  St. error  Mean  St. error  Mean  St. error  Mean  St. error 
Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD)   9.01  5.47  0.31  50.00  8.22  6.61  0.33  6.57  0.35 
Economic Policy (EP)   29.73  6.50  0.19  67.29  4.59  6.81  0.21  6.26  0.20 
Education (EDU)   3.60  6.46  0.42  68.57  7.95  7.52  0.35  7.03  0.37 
Energy and Mining (EM)   4.05  4.59  0.52  31.82  10.06  5.15  0.41  6.35  0.42 
Environment (ENV)   4.95  5.32  0.48  45.45  10.75  6.75  0.44  6.73  0.41 
Finance and Private Sector (FPD)  11.71  5.70  0.36  50.00  8.01  6.46  0.40  6.45  0.35 
Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP)   4.05  5.92  0.36  61.11  8.23  7.42  0.30  6.61  0.31 
Poverty (POV)   15.32  6.97  0.30  83.33  6.89  7.19  0.32  6.29  0.38 
Public Sector Governance (PSG)   6.31  5.28  0.44  37.50  8.67  6.04  0.41  5.93  0.43 
Social Development (SDV)   3.15  5.23  0.31  38.46  13.67  6.73  0.29  5.80  0.43 
Social Protection (SP)   6.31  6.71  0.57  64.71  11.74  7.40  0.48  7.80  0.36 
Transport (TRN)   0.45  5.45  0.66  45.00  11.27  6.65  0.60  6.29  0.39 
Urban Development (URB)   1.35  5.05  0.58  31.58  10.80  6.24  0.52  7.24  0.52 
Total  100.00  5.74  0.10  53.76  2.19  6.59  0.10  6.44  0.10 
Note: the totals include some other sectors with insufficient sample sizes. Sectoral VPU in parentheses (Table 2), though note that sector staff are also in regional 
units.  Table 4: Current and expected future demand for WB research across Vice-Presidencies 
Vice-Presidency  Current reliance on WB 
research (10 point scale) 
Expected increase in demand 
(score for expected future 
demand – score for current) 
  Mean  St. error  Mean  St. error 
Regional VPUs         
Sub-Saharan Africa  5.28  0.28  0.55  0.18 
East Asia and Pacific  4.98  0.33  0.51  0.15 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  5.45  0.34  0.48  0.14 
Latin America and Caribbean  5.18  0.33  0.71  0.18 
Middle East and North Africa  6.05  0.48  0.95  0.26 
South Asia  5.35  0.39  0.80  0.15 
“Sectoral” VPUs         
Finance and Private Sector   4.87  0.76  0.43  0.28 
Human Development   6.38  0.54  0.43  0.27 
Operational Policy   4.46  0.73  0.92  0.64 
Poverty Reduction and Econ. Mgt.   6.45  0.45  0.37  0.16 
Sustainable Development   5.19  0.43  0.63  0.25 
World Bank Institute   5.57  0.79  0.43  0.35 
Total  5.40  0.12  0.59  0.06 
 
Table 5: Current and expected future demand for WB research across sectors 
Sector  Current reliance on WB 
research (10 point scale) 
Expected increase in demand 
(score for expected future 
demand – score for current) 
  Mean  St. error  Mean  St. error 
Agriculture and Rural Development   5.43  0.55  0.40  0.16 
Economic Policy   6.18  0.26  0.72  0.14 
Education   5.58  0.46  0.61  0.23 
Energy and Mining   3.55  0.38  0.74  0.21 
Environment   5.82  0.69  0.35  0.22 
Finance and Private Sector   4.94  0.41  0.58  0.14 
Health, Nutrition and Population   5.64  0.41  0.33  0.13 
Poverty   6.96  0.34  0.67  0.24 
Public Sector Governance   5.31  0.44  0.50  0.33 
Social Development   4.91  0.53  0.64  0.33 
Social Protection   5.87  0.62  0.20  0.17 
Transport   4.67  0.68  0.65  0.27 
Urban Development   5.12  0.48  0.29  0.45 
Total  5.40  0.12  0.59  0.06 
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Table 6: Sources of knowledge on WB research 
  Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
Informal discussion with researcher(s)  4.50  5  2.72 
Hiring researchers (consultants)  4.96  5  2.70 
Report(s) or paper(s)  6.68  7  2.27 
DECRG researcher cross-support  3.69  3  2.56 
Other researcher from Network or other part of WB  5.02  5  2.54 
Product available on the intranet  6.52  7  2.44 
Seminar, workshop or presentation  5.85  6  2.36 
Authored report(s)  5.87  6  2.55 
Flagship report such as WDR, PRR etc  6.53  7  2.49 
Policy Research Working Paper series  6.37  7  2.45 
Journal article authored by Bank staff  4.60  4  2.70 
 
Table 7: Implicit weights on various sources of WB research in predicting familiarity 
 
  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Intercept  2.922  4.685 
Source of WB research:     
   Informal discussion with researcher(s)  0.118  2.695 
   Hiring researchers (consultants)  0.051  1.148 
   DECRG researcher (cross-support)  0.163  3.285 
   Intranet  -0.016  -0.294 
   Seminars, workshop or presentation  0.036  0.679 
   Authored report(s)  -0.070  -1.252 
   Flagship report such as WDR, PRR  0.085  1.649 
   Policy Research Working Paper  0.046  0.811 
   Journal article by WB staff  0.103  1.546 
N  398   
R
2  0.366   
Adjusted R
2  0.301   
S.E. of regression  1.826   
Mean dependent var  5.954   
S.D. dependent var  2.184   
F-statistic  5.610   
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000   
Note: Regression included controls for years of service, sector and VPU. 
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Table 8: Staff assessments of the performance of networks in connecting to WB research 
Sector  Average rating (10 point 
scale) 
High rating (% above 5 
on scale 
  Mean  St. error  Mean  St. error 
Agriculture and Rural Development   4.59  0.46  24.14  8.08 
Economic Policy   4.93  0.28  48.84  5.48 
Education   6.33  0.51  70.00  8.50 
Energy and Mining   4.78  0.65  38.89  11.68 
Environment   4.00  0.66  33.33  12.37 
Finance and Private Sector   4.26  0.48  35.29  8.33 
Health, Nutrition and Population   5.63  0.46  53.33  9.26 
Poverty   5.48  0.47  48.15  9.77 
Public Sector Governance   5.16  0.55  44.00  10.09 
Social Development   4.10  0.78  30.00  14.73 
Social Protection   5.29  0.73  57.14  13.44 
Transport   4.71  0.74  29.41  11.23 
Urban Development   5.38  0.60  43.75  12.60 
Total  4.86  0.13  41.71  2.44 
Note: the totals include some other sectors with insufficient sample sizes. Sectoral VPU in parentheses (Table 2), 
though note that sector staff are also in regional units. 
 
Table 9: Probit regressions for support for more resources for in-house research 
department 
  Coefficient  z-statistic  Coefficient  z-statistic 
Intercept  -1.761  -3.133  -1.430  -3.685 
Familiarity with WB research  0.160  3.490  0.147  3.413 
Technical quality is high  0.109  2.221  0.077  1.619 
Improves AAA effort  0.137  2.242  0.182  3.221 
Improves quality of entry in projects  0.103  2.076  0.063  1.495 
External consultants are useful for your work  -0.101  -2.104  -0.092  -2.134 
It is not difficult to find the research I need  -0.095  -2.207  -0.088  -2.199 
Controls for years of service, years squared, 
location, VPU and sector 
Yes    No 
 
N  322    325   
Pseudo R
2  0.228    0.210   
S.E. of regression  0.424    0.424   
Mean dependent var  0.618    0.615   
S.D. dependent var  0.487    0.487   
LR statistic  114.809    91.134   
Prob(LR-statistic)  0.000    0.000   




Table 10: Summary statistics on perceptions of DEC responsiveness across VPUs 
 
Vice-Presidency  Responsiveness of DEC 
researchers 
(% rating 5+) 
Availability of DEC 
researchers for cross-support 
(% rating 5+) 
  Mean  St. error.  Mean  St. error. 
Regional VPUs         
Sub-Saharan Africa  68.75  6.86  61.82  6.71 
East Asia and Pacific  73.33  8.28  76.67  7.91 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  71.43  8.76  78.79  7.29 
Latin America and Caribbean  66.67  9.31  73.08  8.91 
Middle East and North Africa  71.43  12.39  76.47  10.54 
South Asia  57.14  11.08  36.36  10.51 
“Sectoral” VPUs         
Finance and Private Sector   77.78  14.22  70.00  14.85 
Human Development   78.57  11.25  66.67  13.94 
Operational Policy  50.00  20.94  50.00  20.91 
Poverty Reduction and Econ. Mgt.  86.36  7.51  76.47  10.54 
Sustainable Development   61.54  13.84  50.00  12.81 
World Bank Institute   100.00  0.00  75.00  22.18 
Total  70.95  2.93  66.93  2.96 
Note: the totals include some other VPUs with insufficient sample sizes. 
 
 
Table 11: Summary statistics on perceptions of DEC responsiveness across sectors 
 
Sector  Responsiveness of DEC 
researchers 
(% rating 5+) 
Availability of DEC 
researchers for cross-
support (% rating 5+) 
  Mean   St. error.  Mean   St. error. 
Agriculture and Rural Development   70.59  11.36  75.00  9.94 
Economic Policy   85.96  4.73  79.69  5.16 
Education   60.00  11.26  52.63  11.76 
Energy and Mining   37.50  17.60  50.00  16.23 
Environment   75.00  15.74  75.00  15.72 
Finance and Private Sector   63.64  10.55  58.33  10.33 
Health, Nutrition and Population   80.00  9.20  72.22  10.84 
Poverty   90.48  6.59  85.71  7.84 
Public Sector Governance   81.82  11.96  66.67  13.97 
Social Development   20.00  18.39  28.57  17.53 
Social Protection   66.67  16.16  66.67  16.13 
Transport   37.50  17.60  50.00  18.15 
Urban Development   55.56  17.03  50.00  16.23 
Total  70.95  2.93  66.93  2.96 
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Table 12: Summary statistics on perceived value of WB research to work across Vice-
Presidencies 
Vice-Presidency  Average value of research  
(10 point scale) 
High value attached to 
research (% rating 5 or 
higher)  
  Mean  St. error  Mean  St. error 
Regional VPUs         
Sub-Saharan Africa  5.34  0.25  61.70  5.07 
East Asia and Pacific  5.37  0.32  58.46  6.18 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  5.31  0.32  64.41  6.31 
Latin America and Caribbean  5.59  0.30  67.12  5.56 
Middle East and North Africa  5.92  0.50  70.83  9.39 
South Asia  5.74  0.35  64.00  6.87 
“Sectoral” VPUs         
Finance and Private Sector   6.06  0.75  72.22  10.68 
Human Development   5.90  0.57  66.67  10.41 
Operational Policy  5.47  0.48  58.82  12.08 
Poverty Reduction and Econ. Mgt.  6.46  0.42  77.14  7.18 
Sustainable Development   5.00  0.40  55.00  7.96 
World Bank Institute   7.00  0.48  100.00  0.00 
Total  5.61  0.11  65.51  2.09 
Note: the totals include some other VPUs with insufficient sample sizes. 
 
Table 13: Summary statistics on perceived value of WB research across sectors 
Sector  Average value of research  
(10 point scale) 
High value attached to 
research (% rating 5 or 
higher)  
  Mean  St. error  Mean  St. error 
Agriculture and Rural Development   5.16  0.42  57.89  8.11 
Economic Policy   6.24  0.21  80.37  3.89 
Education   5.85  0.49  60.00  8.39 
Energy and Mining   4.10  0.51  40.91  10.62 
Environment   5.38  0.57  54.55  10.75 
Finance and Private Sector   5.49  0.42  62.50  7.75 
Health, Nutrition and Population   6.17  0.40  75.00  7.31 
Poverty   7.37  0.37  93.33  4.61 
Public Sector Governance   4.90  0.41  53.13  8.93 
Social Development   5.46  0.44  69.23  12.96 
Social Protection   5.47  0.58  64.71  11.74 
Transport   4.88  0.72  60.00  11.09 
Urban Development   4.89  0.49  52.63  11.60 
Total  5.74  0.11  65.51  2.09 
Note: the totals include some other sectors with insufficient sample sizes. Sectoral VPU in parentheses (Table 1), 
though note that sector staff are also in regional units. 
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Table 14: Percentage distribution of types of staff across Vice-Presidencies 
 









Regional VPUs           
Sub-Saharan Africa  23.40  24.47  14.89  37.23  100.00 
East Asia and Pacific  32.31  23.08  9.23  35.38  100.00 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 
25.42  27.12  10.17  37.29  100.00 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
21.92  28.77  10.96  38.36  100.00 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
20.83  12.50  8.33  58.33  100.00 
South Asia  22.00  18.00  14.00  46.00  100.00 
“Sectoral” VPUs           
Finance and Private 
Sector  
22.22  27.78  5.56  44.44  100.00 
Human Development   4.76  14.29  28.57  52.38  100.00 
Operational Policy)  29.41  23.53  11.76  35.29  100.00 
Poverty Reduction and 
Econ. Mgt.  
14.29  14.29  8.57  62.86  100.00 
Sustainable Development   30.00  20.00  15.00  35.00  100.00 
World Bank Institute   0.00  63.64  0.00  36.36  100.00 
Total  22.54  23.70  11.95  41.81  100.00 
Note: the totals include some other VPUs with insufficient sample sizes. 
 
Table 15: Distribution of types of staff across sectors 
 









Agriculture and Rural 
Development  
34.21  15.79  7.89  42.11  100.00 
Economic Policy   10.28  22.43  9.35  57.94  100.00 
Education   22.86  8.57  17.14  51.43  100.00 
Energy and Mining   40.91  27.27  18.18  13.64  100.00 
Environment   36.36  18.18  9.09  36.36  100.00 
Finance and Private 
Sector  
25.00  25.00  12.50  37.50  100.00 
Health, Nutrition and 
Population  
11.11  27.78  13.89  47.22  100.00 
Poverty   6.67  10.00  0.00  83.33  100.00 
Public Sector 
Governance  
37.50  25.00  9.38  28.13  100.00 
Social Development   30.77  30.77  0.00  38.46  100.00 
Social Protection   11.76  23.53  23.53  41.18  100.00 
Transport   20.00  35.00  20.00  25.00  100.00 
Urban Development   36.84  31.58  10.53  21.05  100.00 
Total  22.54  23.70  11.95  41.81  100.00 
Note: the totals include some other sectors with insufficient sample sizes. Sectoral VPU in parentheses (Table 2), 
though note that sector staff are also in regional units. 39 
 
Table 16: Regressions for familiarity with research  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient t-Statistic 
Intercept  4.205  10.855  2.107  5.478  2.184  4.120 
Value of research for own work  n.a.  n.a.  0.421  11.734  0.307  6.888 
Rating of Academia   n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.140  2.519 
Informal contact with researchers  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.136  3.417 
Years of service with WB  0.197  4.222  0.191  4.771  0.152  3.237 
Years squared  -0.006  -3.554  -0.006  -3.915  -0.004  -2.527 
Located in country office  -0.305  -1.440  -0.565  -3.023  -0.639  -3.135 
Agriculture and rural development   0.865  2.211  0.787  2.484  0.744  1.939 
Economic policy   1.629  5.335  1.079  3.806  0.462  1.426 
Education   1.677  3.660  1.301  3.393  0.707  1.545 
Energy and mining   -0.179  -0.312  0.283  0.532  -0.247  -0.409 
Environment   0.564  1.072  0.527  1.224  -0.227  -0.388 
Finance and private sector   0.579  1.353  0.454  1.236  -0.043  -0.107 
Health, nutrition and population   1.063  2.458  0.678  1.719  0.089  0.198 
Poverty   1.980  4.886  1.004  3.105  0.278  0.708 
Public sector governance   0.721  1.539  0.815  2.062  0.388  0.874 
Social development   0.172  0.463  -0.162  -0.468  -0.782  -2.071 
Social protection   1.995  3.578  1.757  2.898  1.118  1.932 
Transport   0.778  1.189  1.450  2.528  0.866  1.260 
Urban development   0.104  0.168  0.116  0.219  -0.407  -0.739 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.381  -1.253  -0.153  -0.543  -0.204  -0.673 
East Asia and Pacific  -0.931  -2.666  -0.517  -1.827  -0.761  -2.392 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  -0.848  -2.479  -0.615  -1.971  -0.673  -2.040 
Latin America and Caribbean  -0.791  -2.441  -0.707  -2.447  -0.899  -2.919 
Middle East and North Africa  -0.196  -0.443  -0.163  -0.476  -0.210  -0.618 
South Asia  0.012  0.031  0.013  0.042  -0.327  -0.912 
World Bank Institute   -0.619  -0.741  -0.415  -0.527  -0.053  -0.052 
Development economics   1.963  1.762  0.708  0.810  0.777  2.250 
N  513    502    374   
R
2  0.174    0.363    0.399   
Adjusted R
2  0.134    0.330    0.352   
S.E. of regression  2.123    1.813    1.700   
Mean dependent var.  5.747    5.839    6.136   
S.D. dependent var.  2.281    2.215    2.112   
F-statistic  4.295    10.871    8.519   
Prob.(F-statistic)  0.000    0.000    0.000   
 
 